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The first round of the presidential election in Ukraine on October 31 brought no surprise. According to
preliminary results announced by the Central Election Commission by noon Monday, November 1,
36.31 percent of over 69 percent of eligible voters who came to the polling stations supported the
incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma.
22.37 percent of the voters voted for leader of Ukrainian Communists Petro Symonenko who has long
been perceived as the opponent whose arrival to the second round of the election with Leonid Kuchma
would practically ensure the latter's victory. Three other major candidates and vehement critics of the
current executive branch - leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the
Progressive Socialists Natalia Vitrenko and Oleksandr Moroz's former ally within the failed "Kaniv
Four", former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yevhen Marchuk received, according to preliminary
calculations, 11.31 percent, 11.06 percent and 8.4 percent of the votes, respectively. Rivals for the
Ukrainian People's Movement Rukh "trade mark" Yuri Kostenko and Hennady Udovenko received
remarkably little support of their split-up electorates - about 2.4 and 1.4, respectively. Other candidates
- leader of the Green party Vitaly Kononov, leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party Vasyl
Onopenko, members of the parliament Yuri Karmazin, Oleksandr Rzhavsky and Mykola Gaber, and
leader of the Slavic party Oleksandr Bazyliuk, regarded as the most likely outsiders from the start of
the campaign, received less than 1 percent of the votes each.
Hence, as analysts predicted taking into account results of the whole variety of opinion polls, Leonid
Kuchma will face Petro Symonenko in the run-off, due in two weeks after the first round.
Although the collapse of the Kaniv Four on the last day when candidates could officially withdraw
from the race, Oleksandr Moroz's last minute refusal to support Yevhen Marchuk as the group's single
candidate, and the decision of Speaker of the parliament Oleksandr Tkachenko to endorse Petro
Symonenko's bid for election instead of supporting one of his former ally did not influence the outcome
of the presidential election radically, those factors made some corrections to the polling results. Leonid
Kuchma received about 4% of the votes less than expected according to most of opinion polls, while
the figures received by Petro Symonenko were substantially higher than analysts predicted, mainly due
to Oleksandr Tkachenko's withdrawal from the race, whose potential voters then followed their
candidate's example and chose to back Symonenko.
According to the exit poll conducted by the Kyiv-based Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the
incumbent President Leonid Kuchma has a clear lead with 41 percent of the votes nationwide. In
second place is Petro Symonenko with about 22 percent of the votes. The vast majority of the voters
indicate that they intend to vote in round two - 88% say definitely and an additional 8% probably. The
interviews were conducted at 300 different voting places in every oblast and in Crimea with a total
sample of 6,000 voters as they were leaving the voting place.
The current election results, contrary to the 1994 presidential election, showed no radical difference in
political preferences of the voters for the top-ranking candidate. Although Leonid Kuchma had a
particularly strong showing in the western oblasts (57%) and in the East Central oblasts (42%, he
received a clear victory in 17 regions throughout Ukraine. In contrast, Petro Symonenko drew broader
support in the Southern (34%) and the Eastern (36%) regions than in the other oblasts. Three other
candidates received about 10 percent of the vote nationwide - Natalia Vitrenko (11%), Yevhen
Marchuk (8.5%) and Oleksandr Moroz (11.3%). In the Kyiv region Leonid Kuchma and Petro
Symonenko were reported to have received 40 and 10 percent of the votes, respectively, while
Oleksandr Moroz received 16%, Natalia Vitrenko - 15% and Yevhen Marchuk - 10%. Natalia
Vitrenko's rating span from 17% in the East-central region to 6% in Western Ukraine, with the national
average of slightly over 11 percent, which is remarkably lower than 20-23 percent forecast in most of
opinion polls, seen by a number of observers as deliberately exaggerated. Oleksandr Moroz received
most of his support in the West-central region (21%) and the Kyiv region (16%), but the number of his
backers dropped dramatically in the West (6%), the South (5%), the East-central region (7%) and the
East (7%), which kept his average rating at about 11.3%, slightly over of that of Natalia Vitrenko. The
support for Yevhen Marchuk was higher in Kyiv (13%), the Western (16%) and West-central (12%)
regions and under 6% in other regions of Ukraine. The resulting average was about 8.5%, i.e.,
substantially lower than predicted by his supporters. One of the reasons for the loss of support in the
West and Kyiv may be his earlier alliance with left-wingers Oleksandr Tkachenko and Oleksandr
Moroz within the Kaniv Four.
Yuri Kostenko, though having no hope whatsoever to win or even to make it to the run-off, obtained
his own moral victory over the leader of the "proper Rukh" Hennady Udovenko. Kostenko got about
4% of the votes in Kyiv, 5% in the West, 3% in the East-central region, 2% in the East and the West-
central regions, and 1% in the South, which brought him to the average of under 3%. His competitor
Hennady Udovenko received the about same number of votes in the West, as well as in the East and the
West-central regions, but was far less popular in Kyiv. Hence, Yuri Kostenko was right to say in the
"Election nights" that Ukrainian national democrats had lost in 1991 when they allowed the former
nomenklatura to hijack their slogans and electorates. The current election has demonstrated that the
lack of unity and the solid base of support continue to undermine electoral chances of the right wing of
Ukraine's political spectrum. Though, in due time, the moral victory over the older and not charismatic
competitor can be converted into attracting a major slice of Mr. Udovenko's voters and using the
expanded base of support for making a bid for power in the 2002 parliamentary and the 2004
presidential campaigns - obviously, in alliance with, and in support of more dynamic and wealthier new
leaders.
Contrary to expected significant revelations of massive violations of the election law, to date
complaints supported by evidence have been scarce. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine, an
organization than monitored the elections in Kyiv and the regions, reported a number of minor
violations but announced they would not be able to influence significantly the election outcome. The
opinion is supported by the statement of the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC)
Mykhailo Ryabets, who announced that CEC had received 37 complaints about violations at individual
polling stations but described most of them as insignificant. Indirectly, the opinion may be supported
by the fact that chairman of the ad hoc parliamentary commission established exactly for preventing
violations of the election law and power abuse by the incumbent president's campaign team, Oleksandr
Yeliashkevych produced no specific facts that would prove the claims of several major violations that
could be used by the incumbent president's opponents to challenge the election outcome. Yet, reports
about significant violations came from the Yevhen Marchuk campaign staff, including a report about
local police forcing out "opposition" observers from the polling station about half an hour before the
polling was over in a mining town of the Donetsk region. Oleksandr Moroz also publicly stated he was
going to protest against the violations in the process of the presidential campaign, though did not
specify any particular claims. While the current presidential election law envisages no mechanism of
announcing the election results to be invalid, the scope of possibilities to challenge the election
outcome and delay, if not prevent, Leonid Kuchma's second ascent of the country's top office ranges
from initiating the impeachment procedure on charges of power abuse to obstructing the official
ceremony of inauguration well beyond the 30-day term after the announced election result, as specified
by the law. Should the continuing confrontation emerge,it may produce a variety of problems, from the
delay in the budget process to implementation of the formally regional initiative to create a pi-cameral
parliament, which would objectively lead to amending the constitution and dissolution of this
parliament.
Yet, the final victory of Leonid Kuchma, notwithstanding the substantial 14% gap between him and his
nearest competitor Symonenko, is neither pre-determined nor guaranteed. The election outcome may
change on favor of Symonenko, if Kuchma's supporters and those who voted for any candidate other
than Symonenko decide not to come to the polling stations again, and/or if Oleksandr Moroz's and
Natalia Vitrenko's "protest electorates" choose to back Symonenko as the only left-wing candidate.
